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ABSTRACT
! Conscripting organs from cadavers represents a radical new approach to the 
problem of organ procurement for transplantation. As it currently stands, there is a wide 
disparity between the supply of viable organs and the need for those organs in order to 
perform life-saving transplantations. There is, therefore, a major problem with the current 
organ procurement model in the United States. Cadaveric organ conscription avoids the 
requirement for consent in organ donation; all candidates for organ donation will have 
viable organs harvested for transplantation under this policy. Organ conscription has the 
potential to close the widening gap between the number of people who need an organ 
transplant and the number of people who donate an organ. 
! I contend that conscription of organs from cadavers is the best approach to adopt 
in order to solve the problem of organ procurement. I defend organ conscription from 
numerous objections, and attempt to show that is is both a practical and desirable policy. 
I conclude not only that the benefits of organ conscription outweigh the drawbacks, but 
also that organ conscription is the most morally desirable approach to procurement. 
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Introduction
! Most people in the United States are aware of the precarious situation of many 
individuals who are sick enough to need an organ transplant to survive. The difficulties 
involved with organ donation have been dramatized in popular media for decades--told 
from the perspectives of patients, donors, and the families of both. The dilemma, in basic 
form, is something that can be easily grasped: there are people who die every year 
waiting for an organ transplant and, at the same time, there are people who die with 
viable, functional organs that for various reasons are not harvested for transplantation. 
Whether one considers this a waste of “precious resources” or simply the unavoidable 
byproduct of a free society is, in my opinion, irrelevant. 
! Those with end-stage organ disease (ESOD) and the newly deceased with viable 
organs are inextricably bound together. On one side are the people whose lives would 
be saved and prolonged for a number of years with one straightforward solution, a new 
organ. On the other side are the people whose lives have already ended, and whose 
bodies will be committed either to the earth or the flames. The relationship between 
these two groups is striking, and morally relevant.
! Although numbers and statistics are abstractions from particular, unquantifiable 
human life, they can often tell a compelling story. As of April 1, 2012, the number of 
individuals on the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) waiting list for an organ 
transplant is officially 113,746. (Active candidates numbered at 72,739; active 
Sahr, Daniel Ryan, 2012, UMSL, p.3
candidates are people who are currently eligible and medically suitable for 
transplantation.) Based on last yearʼs statistics, approximately 28,500 transplants could 
be performed this year, either from a live donor or a cadaver. On average, 18 people die 
daily waiting for a life-saving organ transplant. At the same time, a new patient is added 
to the UNOS waiting list every 11 minutes, or around 131 people every day. Thus, on 
average, an estimated 6,570 people will die every year on the UNOS wait list; around 
47,815 individuals will be added in that same year.1
! There have been many approaches devised to correct the imbalance between 
organ supply and organ need. One approach, targeted to increase the number of organs 
procured, is called cadaveric organ conscription. The many-worded phrase for this 
approach is actually very straightforward. It is a policy intended to increase supply of 
viable human organs by conscripting those organs from cadavers, not unlike the way 
that military recruits are conscripted (or drafted) to increase the number of troops 
available for national defense. The general idea behind cadaveric organ conscription is 
that when people die, they are no longer in need of their vital organs, and those organs 
can and should be transplanted immediately from a cadaver to a still-living person. This 
approach to procurement deemphasizes the role of consent in organ donation. It is 
thought by many who advocate conscription that the functional organs of a recently dead 
body should rightfully be used to preserve life. It is a policy designed to place greater 
value on preserving life, and on reducing human suffering.
! In what follows, I will elaborate on the many features of organ conscription, and 
the arguments required for its success. In particular, there are two arguments that tend 
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1 All facts and figures are taken from two reliable government-run websites: www.organdonor.gov 
and www.optn.transplant.hrsa.gov. OPTN is the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network. OPTN works in conjunction with UNOS to maintain accurate databases for purposes of 
organ allocation. The number of people on the UNOS wait list for an organ transplant in refreshed 
and updated daily; these sites serve as the best sources for the most current statistics.
to be made most often in support of conscription. One is the utilitarian argument that the 
overall amount of good brought about through conscription (that is, the goodness of 
prolonging and saving lives) outweighs the harm done (if any) by ignoring consent. The 
next major argument is that the deceased have no interests, and thus cannot be harmed 
if their wishes are disregarded concerning organ donation. I will discuss both of these 
arguments in further detail in the following sections. These arguments must be 
discussed, and dealt with in turn. However, it should be made known that neither of 
these two arguments has the ability to end the debate entirely. Much more is needed.
! Since it would be too hasty simply to plug numbers into a utilitarian calculus, or to 
recite the “dead people have no interests” argument ad nauseam, my treatment of the 
arguments for and against will go like this: First, I will present both of these pro-
conscription arguments in their strongest forms, along with a few other important 
supporting arguments. Then, I will present a major counterargument to conscription from 
one of its strongest opponents, Walter Glannon. I will also provide a critique of Glannonʼs 
view in an effort to address the philosophical issues related to organ conscription. From 
there, it will be necessary to discuss some of the major reasons that someone might 
actually adopt the anti-conscription (or anti-donation) point of view. I will then take up a 
discussion of these reasons. 
! I will consider a wide range of objections to organ conscription, and organ 
donation in general. In so doing, I hope to justify my own support of it, as well as meet 
much of the resistance readers might feel about it initially. It is my belief that organ 
conscription is the best option currently available for increasing organ procurement and 
decreasing the number of people on the UNOS wait list. I believe that it is the most 
respectful policy with regard to the brain dead, kept alive by artificial means, and the 
living, kept alive either through similar means or by sheer luck.
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Arguments for cadaveric organ conscription
! There are a host of arguments for organ conscription to examine. To begin, it is 
helpful to examine some relevant beliefs and moral intuitions concerning what is perhaps 
the most difficult feature of organ conscription: removal of body parts from a deceased 
personʼs body either against their expressed wishes, or without obtaining permission to 
do so. James Delaney and David Hershenov relate a colorful thought experiment which 
exposes what they think is actually a commonplace attitude to the fundamental issue of 
organ conscription from cadavers. In brief, the scenario goes like this. There is a student 
of philosophy who studied so much about life and death issues that he neglected his 
own care, and subsequently became sick and died. Before he died, he made known his 
desire that his body be immediately interred in a mausoleum and left “forever 
undisturbed.” 
! Next, the cemetery is suddenly struck by lightning and catches fire while 
someone is visiting the deceasedʼs gravesite. That visitor to the mausoleum is then 
faced with the choice: respect the deceasedʼs wish to be undisturbed, or use his corpse 
as a fire shield.2 What most people, including Delaney and Hershenovʼs students, think 
is the proper course of action is to utilize the corpse as protection from the fire. This is 
because the authors think “the saliency of the need of the endangered overrides 
certain...factors and puts us in touch with our core convictions on the matter.”3 
! To put it differently, imagine what a person would do if they were dying in a 
hospital, and a person with end-stage organ disease shared a room with them. Would 
they consent to donate their organs, knowing that that personʼs life would be saved? 
From the perspective of the doctors working there, does it not seem the morally right 
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2 James Delaney & David B. Hershenov, “Why Consent May Not Be Needed for Organ 
Procurement,” American Journal of Bioethics (2009) 9: 3-10.
3 Delaney & Hershenov, p. 4.
thing to do to take the organs from the recently deceased person and transplant them in 
the sick person? When the proximity between the parties involved in such scenarios is 
reduced, it no longer distorts our intuitions about the right thing to do.
! Organ conscription can also be advocated on the grounds that there is a moral 
obligation to donate organs, and that since everyone is bound to this obligation we have 
a right to harvest organs with or without consent.4 The justification for thinking that there 
is a moral obligation to donate organs derives from a similar justification for cases of 
“easy rescue,” when saving a personʼs life comes at little to no cost, effort or trouble to 
oneself. In most examples of easy rescue, it is thought that a duty to help someone in a 
life-or-death situation falls on an individual when they can do so easily. Since in the case 
of organ donation one has already died, consenting to have oneʼs organs harvested after 
death constitutes an example of easy rescue--organs are useless in a dead body. This 
moral obligation can and should be enforced as a legal requirement to give up organs 
after death, as the examples of “Good Samaritan” laws require individuals to engage in 
easy rescues (in some states). 
! It has also been argued that organ conscription is analogous to the practices of 
mandatory autopsy, taxation and the military draft. Aaron Spital mentions that these are 
“widely accepted coercive practices that are designed to benefit the public and that 
require participation of all citizens regardless of their wishes.”5 These “coercive 
practices” are legitimate state interests, aimed at providing for the common good. 
Mandatory autopsies are performed when foul play is implicated in a personʼs death, but 
they are not restricted to the purpose of preventing crime or seeking retributive justice. 
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4 H.E. Emson has argued even more strongly that people should not be able to choose against 
having their organs donated. H.E. Emson, “It is immoral to require consent for cadaver donation,” 
Journal of Medical Ethics (2003) 29: 125-127.
5 Aaron Spital, “Conscription of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: A Stimulating Idea Whose 
Time Has Not Yet Come,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2005) 14: 107-112.
Mandatory autopsies could legitimately be performed also when there are concerns 
about epidemics or pandemics.6 This is done to protect everyone living within a 
particular nation or society.
! Not many objections would be strong enough to override the pressing need to 
research the causes or origin of a communicable disease, or to investigate the details of 
a murder. Similarly, the military draft is an example in which living people are put in 
danger, forcibly, in order to secure the livelihood and freedom of everyone else. 
Compulsory taxation is also carried out in the interest of the society as a whole. The 
creation of a strong, stable society, and its preservation, are important enough to warrant 
some coercive actions. The great amount of good that could be produced from 
conscription of cadaveric organs outweighs many personal objections; the lives of 
thousands are more important than the wishes of one. (As a side note, the organs from 
one cadaver actually can be transplanted in several individuals, depending on tissue 
matching and viability.)
! It could be claimed that these analogies are not all on equal footing. Whereas the 
military draft and taxation are important institutions which benefit everyone within a 
society, organ conscription and transplantation only benefits those individuals who 
happen to have ESOD. On the surface, this objection seems true. However, it breaks 
down when certain Rawlsian considerations are brought to bear on it. Though it is true 
that at the moment of organ removal and transplantation only that specific person is 
directly helped, at some time in the future any one of us could be in need of an organ 
transplant. Thus, because no one can predict whether they will get sick, or be involved in 
an accident and sustain damage to critical organs, and then need an organ, it is both 
rational and ethical that they think of the best interest of those who actually need one 
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now. In other words, we should think of what we might want done if we were in the same 
situation as those who need an organ transplant. We should deliberate with empathy. 
(Or, according to Rawls, behind a “veil of ignorance.”)
! Another important consideration to examine in the argument for organ 
conscription is the relative interests of the dead as compared with the needs of the living. 
Proponents of organ conscription argue that whereas the dead cannot be harmed, those 
living with ESOD are at risk for a substantial amount of harm--i.e., death. Even if it is 
granted that the dead can be harmed (something which is argued foremostly by Walter 
Glannon, but also by others, such as C.L. Hamer and M.M. Rivlin) the amount of harm 
done to them is in no way commensurate with the amount of harm caused to the living 
when they pass away. Apart from harm to the dead, it can be argued that the family 
members of the deceased can be harmed when their wishes are ignored regarding 
treatment of the deceasedʼs body. Again, the interest in those with ESOD in continuing to 
live outweighs any affront that the family may experience because of organ harvesting. 
As Spital puts it, “however much harm conscripting organs would impose on the family, 
the magnitude of such harm could never be large enough to justify allowing people with 
ESOD to die for lack of transplant.”7
! Objections to cadaveric organ conscription are still made on the grounds that the 
option to choose what happens to oneʼs body after death is important enough for 
conscription to cause significant harm, and that such a breakdown of individual 
autonomy would be destructive enough to outweigh potential benefits. R.M. Veatch 
discusses what he calls a policy of “routine salvaging,” another term for organ 
conscription. To him, the argument against conscription is based on principle: “If we are 
a society that insists on respecting the integrity and autonomy of the individual,” he says, 
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7 Spital, p. 109.
“we will not assume that something as closely associated with the essence of the 
individual as his or her body can be appropriated by the state without permission.”8 The 
principle in question is the role of consent in organ donation, and whether respect for 
autonomy can serve as the basis for preserving a consent-based model of organ 
procurement. These are important points, and deserve to be dealt with more extensively. 
! Arguments in favor of cadaveric organ conscription have been made numerous 
times now, replete with compelling examples and persuasive rhetoric. It is not my 
intention in this work simply to regurgitate the original arguments of others. My objective 
here is to pick up where they leave off, and to rigorously defend organ conscription as a 
policy, a moral imperative, and a realistic alternative to ineffective methods of organ 
procurement. Furthermore, I will endeavor to show that many of the assumptions 
necessary for viewing organ conscription as morally justifiable are not unfounded. In the 
end, I hope to be able to convince skeptics not only that conscription is philosophically 
sound, but that it is both desirable and practically feasible as well. In the following 
sections, I will explicate and defend more of these arguments in greater detail.
Evaluating the arguments: meeting some objections
! The utilitarian argument in favor of organ conscription is very strong. However, it 
has been argued by opponents of organ conscription that any policy based solely on 
utilitarian grounds violates individualsʼ autonomy. Walter Glannon, in particular, has said 
that “The main objection to the utilitarian argument for non-consensual harvesting is that 
it ignores or overrides oneʼs basic negative right to decide what others can or cannot do 
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8 R.M. Veatch, Transplantation Ethics. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000, p. 
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to oneʼs body.”9 Glannon argues that an individual can be harmed by having a previously  
expressed wish or interest thwarted after death. When that interest relates to the 
individualʼs body, he thinks, the “special relation” that people have with their own bodies 
overrules the competing interests of others who wish to utilize their functioning organs. 
In his own words:
Because the body is so closely associated with who we are, we can have an 
interest in what is done to it even after we cease to exist...If it is treated in a way 
that does not accord with my wishes or interests, then in an important respect 
this can be bad for me and I can be harmed. The special relation between 
humans and their bodies can make it wrong for others to ignore the expressed 
wish that oneʼs organs not be harvested after death, despite their viability for 
transplantation (154). 
! First, it must be said that, presumably, to “cease to exist” is for oneʼs being to 
perish from the earth. Glannon is muddying the concept of death by insisting that, 
existentially, dead people possess interests even though they themselves no longer 
exist. According to him, these interests are instantiated and made real by previously 
expressed wishes made by the dead. But the subject of those wishes has ceased to 
be.10 Glannon writes as if there were some disadvantaged group of human beings called 
“the dead,” and that they have important rights and claims that we cannot ever ignore. 
His reasoning begs the question: are the dead persons? In particular, do we owe the 
dead the same level of moral consideration that we owe the living? 
! We should not worry about what the deceased would have done, what they 
would have wanted done, or even whether they would approve of decisions being made 
about their remains. Those who have died are, simply put, dead. They no longer exist, 
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(2003), 29: 153-156.
10 Or, if you prefer, think of the subject as having passed on; as an ex-person; as expired and 
gone to see its maker; as bereft of life; as ʻrun down the curtain and gone to join the choir 
invisibleʼ; as a late person; etc.
and for this reason cannot be given the same level of moral consideration that we give to 
existing persons. Even if the dead were somehow thought to have remaining worldly 
interests, they would necessarily be subordinated to the interests of the living, existing 
people who actually occupy that world. The question of what to do with the dead is 
entirely one for the living to answer. Rather, more central to the concerns of this paper, 
the question of what to do with potentially life-saving parts of dead bodies is one that 
should be up to the living to decide. 
! Without question, when a person dies their remains should be properly and 
respectfully handled. What the living do with the dead, though entirely at their discretion, 
must be grounded in reason. There is no compelling interest for the living to dispose of 
the remains of the dead in a way contrary to their previously expressed wishes. In the 
absence of compelling interest, or when the issue is not morally relevant to the living, we 
should certainly follow the wishes of the deceased. However, there is no reason to think 
that harvesting viable organs from cadavers in any way disrespects them. The important 
difference between the conscription of organs from cadavers and improper handling of 
remains is not simply that the interests or wishes of the dead are being thwarted; one is 
an unjustifiable treatment of cadavers and the other is not. There is no morally relevant 
reason to treat the dead with disrespect, to refuse either to bury or cremate according to 
their wishes, or to otherwise desecrate their physical remains.11 
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11 It is telling how important such mistreatment is considering that even the remains of Osama bin 
Laden, after his death by U.S. military forces, were given consideration as to the proper means of 
disposal. According to common Islamic precepts, his body was covered within twenty-four hours 
of death, ritually washed, and then dropped into the sea. The sea burial was not in accord with 
Islamic rituals and requirements, however. The U.S. deemed establishing a burial site on the 
ground contrary to their interests, and did not want to see his grave promoted as a site of worship  
or pilgrimage. In this case, what some may consider disrespectful handling of remains was done 
out of a compelling political interest, with other actions done out of a desire to respect the 
interests and beliefs of the dead.
! The question may arise, though, to what extent we should obey the wishes of the 
deceased as expressed through wills. For example, one might ask why, on this account, 
should we allow any important resources to be transmitted or bequeathed as one 
decrees in a will? If the duty to engage in easy rescue is a justification for conscription, 
then is it not also a justification for forcibly taking oneʼs money and appropriating it for 
humanitarian causes? These questions turn on the difference, if any, between the case 
of organ conscription and the case of seizing oneʼs money or personal property. This is a 
legitimate worry concerning paternalistic interventions in peopleʼs lives. In order for 
organ conscription to survive such criticisms, there must be drawn a principled 
distinction between legally requiring oneʼs organs to be harvested and legally requiring 
oneʼs assets to be used against oneʼs will after death.
! There is, however, a principled distinction between conscripting oneʼs vital 
organs after death and seizing oneʼs property after death. In cases of easy rescue, it is 
important to keep in mind that one is only thought obligated to help when doing so 
causes little or no suffering, trouble or cost to oneself. Forcing people to give up a 
substantial amount of money, or seizing their property or assets, is not an example of 
easy rescue, mainly because it does not come at little to no cost or trouble. It is, in fact, a 
hefty price to pay for doing a variable amount of good. By contrast, bodily organs, of no 
benefit to the cadaver, are straightforwardly beneficial to those who need one 
transplanted in them to survive.
There are surely much better ways to raise money for humanitarian interventions, 
ones that do not intrude on personal liberty and the ability to spend oneʼs money as one 
pleases. Also, we have a good example of an already existing “easy rescue” policy with 
regard to money transmitted through a will: the estate tax. The federal government 
already takes some of the value of assets transmitted through a will. If we wish to 
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engage in easy rescue, we should either marginally increase the estate tax, or simply 
keep it as current policy, and direct a larger portion of the federal budget to famine relief 
or other humanitarian causes. This is analogous to organ conscription, and an example 
of easy rescue. Since such policies like the estate tax already exist, they provide further 
legal precedence for organ conscription. If a proposal to increase taxes or conscript 
cadaveric organs were filtered through a fair political process, it would not be considered 
a violation of autonomy, since a democratic process respects autonomous decision-
making even when it may ultimately go against oneʼs particular position or choice. 
! When there is a morally relevant reason to treat the dead perhaps differently than 
they may have wished while alive, as is the case with cadaveric organ conscription, such 
action is not disrespectful. The morally relevant reason to extract viable organs from the 
dead--sometimes, but not always, contrary to prior wishes--is that thousands of people 
will be spared agonizing, early deaths. Thousands of others will have their quality of 
living dramatically improved. Those who advocate organ conscription (this author 
included) do not take the intervention lightly. Because in our society we respect 
autonomy to the greatest extent possible, any intrusion on personal choice would have 
to be supported by very weighty considerations. (More on respect for autonomy later.) 
The statistics presented and discussed at the beginning of this paper, I believe, provide 
sufficient justification for such intrusion.
! Secondly, the concept of harm needs to be analyzed if we are to talk about harm 
sustained by the deceased, and harms sustained by those living who have the 
knowledge that their organs will be taken without their consent (if conscription were 
adopted, that is). Who exactly is harmed, and in what way are they harmed? I will deal 
with these issues more as we go along, but one counterargument to the claim that no 
one is directly harmed by conscription is that individuals who wish to maintain bodily 
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integrity after death are harmed while they are alive knowing that their wishes will be 
ignored with regard to their bodies once they die. Thus, the argument goes, the subject 
is harmed before the putative violation occurs; the knowledge of such violation is itself a 
psychological harm. 
! It seems hard to argue against this view by claiming that that person is not in fact 
harmed. However, that “violation” is only as harmful as the desire connected with it is 
important or weighty. The desire to maintain bodily integrity is a bizarre wish. It may 
harm people to have their wishes thwarted, but bizarre wishes are not nearly as salient 
as others, and in most cases we are not obligated to fulfill or obey them. The knowledge 
of having oneʼs wishes ignored after oneʼs death may not be detrimental enough to be 
considered a harm, though. It could be thought of as more of a conflict or a challenge to 
oneʼs adaptive skills rather than a harm. A sincere desire to keep oneʼs bodily organs 
retained in oneʼs corpse after death is another in a long list of desires that others are in 
no way obligated to fulfill. 
! Thwarting the interests of both the dead and the living is not de facto a harm. If it 
were, then everyone is harmed nearly all of the time; we will all have our critical, vital, or 
integral interests thwarted at some point in our lives. No one gets everything that they 
want, even when it relates to the treatment of their own bodies, or interests related to the 
body and the avoidance of harm. In any society, the principles of autonomy and 
benevolence (or paternalism) must be weighed against each other; no one principle is 
predominant over the other.12 This is where examples like forced taxation, the military 
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12 Not only must they be weighed against each other, it is not always clear when one is 
preponderant over the other. Diseases like Alzheimerʼs which involve a gradual degeneration of 
cognitive abilities and executive function, and which usually include major personality changes, 
present problematic situations for care-givers and family members. When someone has become 
a radically different person because of the progression of their disease, do we still respect their 
autonomy by following their wishes? Or, should the desires of the pre-disease self be the proper 
guide? For more on this issue, see Pam R. Sailors, “Autonomy, Benevolence and Alzheimerʼs 
Disease,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2001), 10: 184-193. 
draft, and mandatory autopsies are especially instructive. Taxation, the draft, and 
mandatory autopsies are practices which can be quite oppressive, and in the case of 
taxation and the draft they are oppressive to those who are alive.13 However, it is not 
commonly argued that everyone is harmed because they are forced to pay taxes to the 
state. Furthermore, the military draft is a state intrusion on the interests of the living to 
remain alive, and to avoid mortal danger in the form of warfare. Yet, it is a common 
practice in many nations to implement a policy of conscription in times of war, and in the 
United States this has happened five times. The legal status of the draft and selective 
service indicates that providing sufficient troops to ensure national security is a 
legitimate state interest, and justifies violation of individual autonomy.14
! The interests of draft-dodgers (during wartime) and tax-evaders are routinely 
thwarted and, on Glannonʼs account, they are seemingly harmed. However, if a person 
dies leaving behind a wealthy estate and the expressed desire for no money to go to the 
government, we donʼt say that that exact person is harmed when the government seeks 
compensation for taxes they may have owed. The argument made by Glannon, and 
others opposed to the idea of cadaveric organ conscription, is that a very real harm can 
befall someone even after they have died.15 This idea is called “posthumous harm,” and 
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14 Aaron Spital & Charles A. Erin, “Conscription of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: Letʼs at 
Least Talk About It,” American Journal of Kidney Diseases (2002), 39: 611-615.
15 The idea that the dead can be actually harmed is thought to originate from Aristotle, when in 
the Nicomachean Ethics he says: “That the fortunes of his descendants and of all those near and 
dear to him do not affect the happiness of a dead man at all, seems too unfeeling a view and 
contrary to the prevailing opinions.” Whatever the prevailing opinion is now, it seems obvious that 
the dead manʼs happiness or surviving reputation is not nearly as important as the happiness of a 
living individual, given the chance to continue living. We may have to make some dead people 
unhappy in order to save many lives.
it is a common response to the contention that the dead have no interests.16 It is not 
clear, however, that the dead can be harmed, as the justification for posthumous harm is 
founded on respecting the interests and wishes of living individuals before death. 
Furthermore, respect for the interests and wishes of persons, either living or dead, does 
not translate automatically into command. Insofar as there are obligations to respect the 
surviving interests of dead individuals, they are still subject to the strictures imposed by 
being members of a shared human society. 
! So what exactly is it that violates the dead to the point that many argue they are 
being harmed? The aforementioned quotation by Glannon indicates that there is some 
“special relation” between humans and their bodies that makes doing something to their 
bodies without permission--in life the same as in death--an absolute wrong. Glannon 
does not, however, elaborate or expound upon this ostensible connection. What is that 
special relation? Is it identity? Is it ownership? Are we to identify the essence or soul of a 
person with the physical body? To do so would be to ignore the teachings and beliefs of 
every major world religion, not to mention various traditions within philosophy that think 
there is more to life than merely the observable brute facts of the world.
! I do not in fact think that Glannon and other anti-conscription philosophers 
believe that the body is identical with the soul, or that the human soul (whatever it may 
be) can be reduced to the physical. Yet, such argumentation invites speculation of this 
type. One could very well claim that the body is synonymous or otherwise identical to the 
soul. The objection, then, is that the special relation between people and their bodies is 
indeed an inviolable one and, absent expressed consent (before or after death), 
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someone can therefore be harmed by invasive or unwanted procedures. This objection, 
of course, is easily argued away. If the body and soul were thought to be one and the 
same, then when the body dies the soul also dies. Or if we were to assume that there is 
no such thing as the soul, but only the body, then biological death marks the absolute 
end of a personʼs identity, essence and existence. Thus, the so-called special relation 
itself no longer exists; death will have negated the force of that relation. We would no 
longer need to worry about offending the special relation between humans and the soul/
body. 
! Though there may be people who make such objections, philosophers and 
writers who oppose organ conscription--or even other methods of procurement, such as 
presumed consent or mandated choice--tend to make more sophisticated arguments. 
One main philosophical bulwark in the argument against organ conscription is the 
principle of autonomy. The right of the individual to decide matters relevant to their own 
life, a right to self-determination, the negative right to govern oneʼs own body, freedom 
from coercion--all are essential features of individual autonomy and the pillars of a liberal 
society. To a very large extent, these are principles upon which our nation is founded. 
Thus, the importance of the principle of autonomy in medical ethics cannot be 
understated. It is worth examining some of the objections that could be made on the 
grounds that a policy of cadaveric organ conscription intrudes on an area of human 
existence that is properly left to individual choice.
! One main objection to the idea that organs can be harvested from the dead and 
transplanted into the sick without prior consent is that what happens to our bodies after 
we die can be considered an integral part of our “life plan.” Therefore, if we wish to 
respect the autonomy of the individual and their right to self-determination, we must also 
respect their wishes after death regarding treatment of the body. Glannon (again) 
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provides further justification for this view by claiming that the body is “essential to the 
development of a self in a life plan,” and that an interest in bodily integrity plays a major 
role in that plan.17 This argument makes a very interesting assertion: what happens to 
oneʼs internal organs after death belongs to an overarching plan one devises for oneʼs 
life. 
! This idea curiously ties together two seemingly contradictory concepts. That 
events taking place well after oneʼs death can be considered important, if not essential, 
to oneʼs life plan--the very personal decisions one makes when choosing how to live--is 
a somewhat difficult concept. This is akin to saying that the way someone lives their life, 
the choices they make and the paths they take, has a lot to do with what other people do 
after they have died. It is easy to see how end-of-life decisions can be a part of oneʼs life 
plan. The experience of growing old, of dying and suffering physical and/or mental 
decline is directly a part of oneʼs life. After-life decisions (made by other, living people) 
are another matter. 
! It might even make sense to include the care of oneʼs property and estate after 
death as an important part of a life plan. However, there is a significant difference 
between oneʼs property and bodily integrity after death, and it makes talk of the former 
belonging to a life plan coherent and the latter incoherent. Again, when discussing the 
interests of the dead, it is important to point out that the things we think the dead are 
interested in are in fact things they were interested in when they were alive. Naturally, 
maintaining bodily integrity while alive is something every living person is interested in, 
by virtue of being alive and wishing to remain so. Before we die, we wish to sort out the 
transmission of property and other material possessions so as to benefit those 
individuals close to us who still survive. These are things in life that someone has 
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acquired and has the right to dispense with as they please. What happens to those 
material possessions after death could fit in nicely with a life plan. 
! The key questions here are what harm is actually done by taking vital organs 
from a personʼs body once they have already died? No real harm is done. What harm is 
actually done by seizing property and wealth that a person acquired in life, and 
preventing that property from being transmitted according to that personʼs will? Quite a 
bit of harm, not only to the deceased personʼs life plan (it makes sense to put away 
money to provide for oneʼs children, for example, and for this to be an essential part of a 
life plan) but also to the individuals connected to that person who survive their death. 
The harm to those people--the living, surviving family and friends of the deceased--is 
sufficient to outweigh the good that would come from taking that money. The damage 
done to personal autonomy, and the right to order oneʼs affairs and possessions as one 
sees fit, would be significant. 
! Defying personal wills regarding the transmission of property to living heirs would 
be a detrimental practice for everyone within that society. Defying personal wills 
regarding the maintenance of bodily integrity after death would be detrimental to no one, 
and beneficial to many. Though one could argue that the person whose will is 
disregarded is in fact harmed, or the family is harmed by witnessing such disregard, the 
damage done to the general respect of autonomy is small, or even insignificant. The 
harm visited upon the dead, or the family of the dead, is also insignificant. 
Further, nobody actually benefits from the choice to retain oneʼs vital organs after 
death, not even the deceased. We do not respect a person by fulfilling their every wish, 
desire, or whim; we respect them by honoring their lives, not their deaths. We can 
disagree with, and act against, oneʼs choices and still not violate a fundamental and 
universal right to make them. Ignoring oneʼs wish to maintain bodily integrity (absent 
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religious reasons) is a good example of this. The lives that can be saved from the organs 
in one body (one cadaver can provide organs for many transplants in many different 
people) far outweigh the good that comes from allowing people to keep organs in their 
bodies after death. The harm resulting from ignoring such wishes is not near as great as 
the harm that comes from the suffering and death of those in need of a transplant.
! It does not, therefore, make a lot of sense why someone would include 
maintaining bodily integrity after death as an essential part of that same life plan. In fact, 
given modern capabilities for organ transplantation, it runs counter to the very reason 
people make wills and bequeath property to others--to benefit those who continue to live. 
Therefore, if bodily organs are to play any important role in a personʼs life plan, they 
should be transmitted, if possible, to living individuals as property would. The only 
difference would have to be that organs go to those whose critical interest in living is 
being threatened at that time. In effect, the life plan objection seems to be more a 
defense of an individualʼs right to make selfish choices, even after death, rather than a 
defense of a morally important personal choice. In this case, one argument made in 
favor of organ conscription is particularly germane: the interest in keeping oneʼs 
deceased body full of vital organs must be weighed against the interest of the sick to 
continue living. An interest in bodily integrity may indeed form a part of oneʼs life plan, 
but in most cases it cannot outweigh anotherʼs interest to prevent their life plan from 
meeting an abrupt end.
! If we are to take the “life plan” objection to organ conscription seriously, then the 
reason one wishes to retain vital organs within their bodies after death becomes a fair 
topic of debate and discussion. Even free choices must be evaluated and weighed 
against competing considerations. Individual freedoms are not, and have never been, 
absolute. In the following section, I will evaluate some of the major reasons why people 
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commonly object to having their organs removed posthumously. Specifically, there are 
eight themes derived from various attitudinal studies about organ donation that impact 
an individualʼs decision to become a donor. Not every theme surrounding the issue 
presents a negative view of organ donation. In fact, a few indicate that there are some 
reasons that many people share for supporting donation, or becoming a donor. 
Reasons for opposing organ donation
! Joshua Newton identified eight major themes about attitudes that people have 
toward posthumous organ donation in his examination of twenty-seven different articles 
published within the qualitative literature.18 Ranked in order of relevance and degree of 
concern expressed by those involved in the various studies, the eight themes are as 
follows:
1. Religion
2. The medical profession
3. The body
4. Transplant recipients
5. Altruism
6. Death
7. The family
8. Personal relevance
! Of these eight themes, concerns about altruism actually motivate people to 
become an organ donor. Personal relevance, thoughts about death, and concerns for 
oneʼs family account for significant areas of either ignorance or misunderstanding of the 
organ donation and transplantation process. It seems that for a large number of people 
interviewed in the studies, the issue of organ donation might only become important 
once it had touched their lives in a personal way. Examples of this include experiencing 
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a loved one in need of an organ, contemplating oneʼs own time of dying, or considering 
the impact that organ donation and/or death could have on oneʼs family. Themes 1-4, 
however, account for much of the resistance individuals have to organ donation in 
general. I will evaluate and discuss these four themes as they specifically relate to 
cadaveric organ conscription. 
Theme 1: Religion
! Religious belief is often thought to be a major reason that people object to organ 
donation. Upon informal discussion of ideas related to cadaveric organ conscription, 
many people may question whether such a policy violates individual rights to free 
practice of religion, and respect of those beliefs on the part of the government. 
Furthermore, one central religious objection to organ donation is the “bodily integrity” 
argument--that maintaining bodily integrity after death is important. Recall that Glannon, 
Veatch, and others who oppose cadaveric organ conscription also draw on the bodily 
integrity argument, but for different purposes. Their motivations for making the argument 
stem from a desire to defend what they believe is an important component of individual 
autonomy. At the end of the previous section, I indicated that the objection to organ 
conscription based on bodily integrity as an essential part of oneʼs life plan could only be 
successful if oneʼs reasons for preserving bodily integrity were good. Before proceeding 
to discuss the argument made from religious grounds, I would like to analyze the bodily 
integrity argument on its own. 
! Beliefs need not always be rational, or even held for what we would consider 
good reasons, in order to be worthy of respect by others. When one has the free will to 
form a life plan, many beliefs that form a central part of that plan may or may not make a 
lot of sense; they may only fit the plan insofar as the person who believes them decides 
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that they do. Outside observers may approve or disapprove of particular beliefs held or 
actions taken in other peopleʼs lives. In most cases, the principle of autonomy is thought 
to overrule this kind of unfair judgment, and moral reflection leads us to defend most 
individual rights from the interference of others. But in considering the odd case of bodily  
integrity as a central part of oneʼs life plan, an individualʼs reasons for such a belief must 
be pressed. Viable human organs are too valuable a resource, and the lives of the sick 
and dying waiting for one (or more) are too important, for oneʼs desire to maintain bodily 
integrity after death to warrant unscrutinized respect. This is a belief that should be 
evaluated.
! First, we should ask what it means to preserve bodily integrity. What sort of 
postmortem interventions compromise the integrity of the body? It is not always clear 
whether certain actions done to the body affect its physical integrity. For instance, if the 
corneas in the eyes were taken in order to help those who have some form of a visual 
disorder, is the integrity of the eyes as a whole compromised? The eyes do not need to 
be functional after death, and the appearance of the eyes will not have been radically 
altered. Additionally, no organ as a whole will have been removed. This applies equally 
to the liver. Since only a small lobe of the liver needs to be transplanted into another 
personʼs body for it to grow into a full-size, functioning organ, only a portion of a cadaver 
liver must be harvested. The liver, for the most part, will remain in the cadaver and at the 
same time someone will receive a life-saving transplant. 
! If those considerations do not convince someone that bodily integrity is a 
troublesome concept, then perhaps further questioning is required. Does the concept of 
bodily integrity require that one die in possession of all of oneʼs original vital organs? It is 
not fully understood whether the term “bodily integrity” applies to oneʼs original body 
parts and natural state, or whether it simply applies to the condition of the body at the 
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moment of death. This question is important because, relatedly, we can ask whether the 
act of receiving an organ from another personʼs body as a transplant will compromise 
the original integrity of oneʼs body. In such a case, the person who is so intent on 
maintaining bodily integrity as an essential part of their life plan should, it seems, be 
inclined to refuse transplantation of someone elseʼs organs. This is usually not the case, 
and instances of people who are unwilling to donate an organ but completely willing to 
receive one abound.19
! Perhaps the idea of bodily integrity has more to do with any sort of meddling in 
the physical state of the body at the moment of death, or any time thereafter. In this 
case, we would expect a person who is concerned with posthumous bodily integrity to 
desire not to be handled by a coroner. Viewed from this perspective, the bodily integrity 
of a great number of people is compromised when they are subjected to the gruesome 
process of embalming, and other postmortem preparations for burial. Yet there is not a 
large body of philosophic literature raising objections to the practice of embalming on the 
grounds that it is a violation of bodily integrity, and thus autonomy, for those concerned 
with maintaining it. Finally, as I mentioned earlier in the course of discussing the 
argument for cadaveric organ conscription, there is already strong precedent for ignoring 
an individualʼs desire for bodily integrity in the case of mandatory autopsy. The 
justification for mandatory autopsy makes trumping certain autonomous choices in favor 
of a greater good or greater compelling interest legitimate.20 
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20 This is, of course, not to say that as a general rule such action is always justified. The specific 
justification for mandatory autopsies applies to the discussion here because it deals with 
overriding autonomous choices made by people who no longer exist. Namely, it deals with 
ignoring the prior wishes of the dead in favor of a compelling interest on the part of the living. The 
analogy between mandatory autopsies and organ conscription is pretty plain. 
! I have tried to show that the bodily integrity argument by itself is not very 
coherent, or well-defined. If someone desires bodily integrity after death because of 
weakly justified beliefs, or even for no reason in particular (they just felt like exercising 
their right to autonomy, maybe), their interest does not outweigh the interest in 
continuing to live of those with ESOD waiting on the transplant list. However, the bodily 
integrity objection may be worth honoring if it is associated with a religious tradition or 
religious belief, both common sources of resistance. I will next briefly examine the bodily 
integrity argument in the context of religious belief. Then, I will discuss the possibility of 
granting an exemption to organ conscription on religious grounds. 
! Newton states that “the religious belief most commonly used to reject organ 
donation was the notion that bodily integrity should be maintained to safeguard 
progression into the afterlife.”21 Though belief in an afterlife need not be attached to any 
particular religious tradition, it is commonly thought of as belonging to the purview of 
religion. Despite the sacrosanct status enjoyed by many religious beliefs, this one should 
be challenged in order to clarify its meaning and significance. Could the person making 
this objection identify a non-arbitrary point at which a cadaver can lose its organs, or 
otherwise lose its physical integrity, and the person associated with that body still gain 
entry to a heaven or an afterlife? This is an important question for the religious objector 
to answer, since eventually all bodies will begin a process of biological decay in which 
organs and tissues “return to the ʻbiomassʼ.”22 They will need to identify at what point this 
inevitable and natural process of decay does not affect the deceased individualʼs 
progression into the afterlife.
Sahr, Daniel Ryan, 2012, UMSL, p.26
21 Newton, p. 3.
22 Spital, p. 109. This point is made in connection with the work of both John Harris and H.E. 
Emson. 
! However, if no non-arbitrary point in this process can be defended by objectors to 
organ conscription, then the natural decay of the postmortem body undermines the 
rationale for concern about bodily integrity going into the afterlife. There must be some 
point where this need for bodily integrity no longer matters. For, if it is at the exact time of 
death that it does not matter--perhaps because one also believes that the soul has 
already departed and abandoned its worldly vessel; or the soul, organs and all, has 
already made its passage to the “other side”--then conscription of cadaveric organs does 
not violate this requirement. A person will have already died and been well on their way 
to the afterlife before viable organs are harvested from their body. 
! A possible answer to this criticism could be that the bodily integrity requirement 
for the afterlife plays a significant role in burial rituals. One could say that it is believed 
that the body must be intact at the time of burial, or specifically when given religious rites 
or ceremonial treatment. This move will only serve to shift the burden of proof to the 
person who wishes to receive an exemption from organ conscription; they will have to 
demonstrate that their beliefs are associated with a particular religion, and that the 
religion has a well-defined perspective on proper burial rites. Then, the bodily integrity 
argument is being tied to verifiable doctrinal belief, and not mere asserted belief. This 
makes evaluating its authenticity a bit easier.
! One further point to consider in cases of objection based on belief is how closely 
analogous the bodily integrity objection is to conscientious objection to war. If a U.S. 
citizen, when found qualified for military service, can prove that he or she opposes war 
for religious or moral reasons, they can be classified as a conscientious objector and can 
be exempt from combat duty. Importantly, this objection need not be based on religious 
belief, though it is commonly associated with religion. If a person were to argue that 
having organs removed from their bodies after death is an egregious violation of 
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personal conscience, perhaps they should be accommodated and allowed an 
exemption, similar to conscientious objection to war. 
! We must ask, however, for what reason oneʼs conscience is so opposed to organ 
transplantation or even donation, that that person feels compelled to resist posthumous 
recovery of bodily organs. In the case of war, it is usually quite obvious why a person 
argues against engaging in combat: there is much to be said against war, and killing, 
and little to be said against remaining peaceful in oneʼs personal life and actions. To 
force someone to fight against, and possibly kill, another person against his or her 
conscience would indeed be wrong. When we talk about a personʼs conscience, what I 
think we refer to is their ethical or moral code. Apart from a strongly held religious belief, 
what grounds would one have for opposing life-saving organ transplantation? Since 
organ conscription would be carried out after a person had died, even if harm is caused 
it is not more immoral than it is moral to provide an ailing person with new vital organs. 
That is, once again, the good of conscription overwhelms any possible bad. The same 
cannot be said for the military draft, and thus it is allowed that conscientious objectors be 
exempt from the fight.
! How, and under what conditions, can a religious exemption to cadaveric organ 
conscription be granted? One possible solution is to require that those who seek an 
exemption base their objections on the text, scripture, or official doctrine of the religion to 
which they belong. Spital intimates something like this when he mentions a “strong 
burden of proof” that he thinks should be required in order to discourage false claims of 
religious belief to obtain an exemption.23 There are at least two problems with this 
solution, though. One is determining whether a person is actually an adherent of a 
particular religion, or if they are simply using a religious text as justification. Another 
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problem is with textual interpretation. Even experts within a religious tradition will usually 
disagree over the meaning of significant passages in holy books. If there is any 
ambiguity it could be difficult to determine the meaning of a passage, and consequently 
to decide whether it suffices as proof for an exemption.
! Thus, another possible solution to the problem of religious exemption is to rely on 
religious authorities--priests, pastors, rabbis, imams, and other clergy--to attest to a 
personʼs membership and involvement in their stated religion. This, unfortunately, places 
quite a bit of pressure on religious leaders. It also invests them with a significant amount 
of power and influence on the issue of organ conscription, and excludes people who, for 
various reasons, are not active within the religious community. These are undesirable 
consequences, and would make the entire religious exemption process invalid. It is also 
not clear how true, genuine belief in a specific religious stance could be gauged. I donʼt 
think this is possible to do, even for religious leaders. 
! There remains, perhaps, a middle way to allow for a religious exemption to organ 
conscription. Some substantive proof that the religious belief cited is real, and is 
advocated by a religion or church recognized by the government as such, should be an 
important component. The criteria for proof, though still difficult, could include some 
combination of text or doctrine and a testimony on behalf of a religious authority as to 
the veracity of the interpretation of the text, as well as a statement of familiarity with the 
person in question. Along with these provisions, a further disincentive could then be 
added. What I will call the “reciprocity rule” would stipulate that those who refuse to have 
their organs harvested under a policy of cadaveric organ conscription also thereby waive 
any right to receive, in a future scenario, a life-saving organ transplant. They will 
effectively remove themselves from the pool of people who could potentially donate and/
or receive an organ. The objection to organ conscription therefore must be based on 
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substantive reasons, with actual support coming from within a religious tradition. It must 
also be completed conscientiously, meaning would-be objectors must be fully informed 
of the consequences of their actions. 
! The basic idea of the reciprocity rule is that if a person is willing to receive an 
organ, then they are also willing to give an organ, if needed. If a person is not willing to 
receive an organ, then they are not obligated to give one. There are two very crucial 
features to this solution, though: 1) People who had formerly objected on religious 
grounds, and consented neither to give or receive an organ per the reciprocity rule, 
could receive an organ if it was needed provided that they would then have to drop their 
objections and join the “conscriptable” donor pool. 2) The reciprocity rule can only apply 
to a religious-based exemption, and should not be available to anyone who opposes the 
idea of conscription. If everyone were allowed to opt-out of conscription with the 
stipulation that they could not receive an organ in the future if needed, the policy would 
effectively be compromised because a) it would no longer be a policy of conscription, per 
se--it would in fact be a routine recovery with opt-out policy; and b) the force of moral 
justification behind conscription would be voided.
! The latter point requires elaboration. It does not seem feasible, nor morally 
desirable, to foist upon the medical profession a requirement not to save lives, cure 
diseases, and perform critical procedures on a person in times of need based on their 
past actions. That is, if a person with a serious personal objection to organ donation 
decides to opt-out and simultaneously waives the right to receive a transplant if needed, 
physicians would be compelled to enforce the consequences of their actions, namely 
denying them the life-saving treatment they know the patient needs. It would be wrong, 
not to mention totally impractical, to require this. Furthermore, organ conscription is not 
meant to be punitive in nature.
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! As to the former point, I think there are numerous reasons why one would prefer 
conscription to any kind of opt-out policy. A routine recovery with opt-out policy is a form 
of presumed consent. Organ harvesting is thought to be justified when the wishes of the 
deceased are unknown, and no objection has been recorded; the consent of the 
deceased is presumed as given. In cases of presumed consent, the state does not 
remain agnostic about an individualʼs wishes when it, perhaps, should. Presumed 
consent policies are seemingly designed to respect the idea that consent is a 
requirement for organ donation, while also providing a way to harvest in cases where a 
personʼs wishes are not known. However, if our procurement policy is to be based on 
consent, it should respect it completely, not partially. This is an area where I agree with 
Veatch: “What is so offensive is the desperate attempt to hold on to the consent and 
donation model by using the language of consent for what is really a policy of routine 
salvaging...It [presumed consent] dresses salvaging in the flimsy outer garb of the 
consent doctrine. Far better, if one favors salvaging, to admit it openly.”24
! Furthermore, if we are going to allow people to choose whether they wish to 
donate organs, that choice should be completely free from coercion, either subtle or 
strong. No form of penalty or disincentive should be attached to the choice to donate or 
withhold oneʼs organs. If we are going to respect consent, it should be respected all the 
way through. Those who decide to opt out should not be penalized for their choice, if 
consent is to remain a central part of our procurement policy.
! The reciprocity rule is not intended to punish those seeking religious exemptions. 
Indeed, many of the reasons why I think the rule could actually work for religious-based 
exemptions have to do with the realities of current religious practices. For one, much 
religious objection is founded on a more general rejection of modern science and 
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modern medical practices. That is, specifically, those who object on religious grounds 
usually do so from the belief that not only giving, but more importantly receiving an organ 
from the body of another person is wrong, or goes against the teachings of their religion. 
Likewise, many religious traditions that forbid organ donation, live or posthumous, also 
forbid such simple medical interventions as blood transfusions, intravenous fluid 
resuscitation, and chemical treatment (e.g., pharmacological medications, anesthetics, 
etc.).25 Many of these medical practices are prerequisites for the transplantation 
operation, and thus adherents to religions that forbid them would necessarily be 
ineligible for receipt of a new organ. 
! A final argument I will make in support of the reciprocity rule and the religious-
based exemption to organ conscription is that most clergy, across the many different 
traditions, are in fact supportive of organ donation.26 This especially includes many major 
world religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam among them. Thus, if someone truly 
seeks to find out the position their religion of choice takes on organ donation, they will 
likely find little or no resistance to it by the clergy. Additionally, they will probably have a 
difficult time finding substantive religious reasons to back up their personal objection to 
donation or to conscription. 
! It seems that, on further inspection, resistance to the concept of organ donation 
and the process of transplantation is not as widespread among the religiously inclined as 
is commonly thought. What is undoubtedly needed, however, is extensive education 
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about organ donation and its relationship to religious belief. This is important regardless 
of whether cadaveric organ conscription is implemented as an actual policy. 
Theme 2: The medical profession
! Newton identified mistrust of the medical profession as a common source of 
concern among study participants. Some individuals expressed a worry that doctors 
“would deliberately remove a patientʼs organs before the patient had died,” while other 
people believed “life-saving medical care would be withheld so that patients could 
become eligible for organ donation.”27 Thus, an important point to make in order to 
counter fears about potential abuses of power by people working in the medical 
profession is that simple safeguards can be implemented that would prevent much, if not 
all, of the abuse. Though this does seem a somewhat irrational fear, it is nonetheless a 
valid cause for concern. A discussion of different ways to address and prevent abuses 
within the health care system is crucial for the success of the cadaveric organ 
conscription argument.
! To address the concern that doctors would harvest organs before a person had 
actually been declared dead, I would point out two facts about the process of organ 
recovery. First, current procedures that govern how doctors, nurses and other medical 
support staff approach a candidate for organ donation explicitly preclude the possibility 
of premature organ recovery. A person must be declared dead by physicians invested 
with the proper authority to do so before transplantation procedures can begin. Second, 
the doctors who treat patients with life-threatening medical conditions and the surgeons 
who perform organ removal and transplantation are always two completely distinct 
groups. That is, the doctors who do the actual surgical removal of organs are not in any 
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way involved with a patientʼs treatment before death. Therefore, organ recovery would 
only occur once all efforts to save a life have been exhausted, and a person has been 
declared dead by independent, treating physicians.28 These are two strict conditions that 
health care and regulatory agencies impose on hospitals and the medical professionals 
working in them.
! The idea that doctors might withhold life-saving medical care so a patient would 
become eligible for organ donation (i.e., passively killing patients) is most certainly 
unfounded. However, this worry may arise out of an awareness of the dire need for 
viable organs in our society, and the difficult decisions that physicians may find 
themselves having to make when confronted with life-or-death situations. Many people 
may worry about medical professionals inserting their own personal biases, values, and 
agendas into the care they deliver. Such fears will likely not disappear overnight, nor will 
they be calmed through reasoned argument and persuasion alone. Still, I would argue, 
contrary to what I imagine is most peopleʼs first reaction, that a policy of cadaveric organ 
conscription would most effectively disarm this concern. It would accomplish this by 
satisfying a simple principle of supply-and-demand. Implementing a policy of organ 
conscription would cause the overall supply of viable organs to increase almost 
immediately, and in turn the demand for organs would relax. Consequently, there would 
be little need for physicians to hasten a diagnosis of death in order to procure badly 
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28 Source: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) Policies, “Minimum 
Procurement Standards for an Organ Procurement Organization (OPO),” updated on 6/29/2011. 
All policies, bylaws, and policy proposals are public record. Pdf files of all OPTN policies can be 
found at: http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp. 
needed organs. Conscription would already have eased the imperative to harvest organs 
that, perhaps, medical professionals feel a duty to obey.29
Theme 3: The body
! Concerns about the body intersect greatly with religious belief and worries about 
unethical or disrespectful treatment by medical professionals. In a summary of the 
studies by theme, people generally expressed a desire not to have their bodies 
considered as “meat,” raw material, or as something for doctors to greedily dissect and 
treat as mere spare parts. Newton does seem to think, however, that there is evidence 
within the reviewed studies to show that if individuals were reassured that harvesting 
viable organs was handled respectfully and “in a manner that preserves the outward 
appearance of the body,” these concerns could be resolved.30 Respectful treatment of 
the body was discussed earlier, in response to Glannonʼs idea that the dead can be 
harmed or otherwise disrespected if their prior wishes regarding organ donation were not 
upheld. In practice, if the organ recovery process was transparent and based on clearly 
defined criteria, this worry could be assuaged. As an actual policy, if cadaveric organ 
conscription was publicly debated, and instituted with fair, plain and understandable 
parameters it could become much more palatable to the general public. 
! Important, too, is the reality that not all organs would need to be harvested under 
conscription. A good example of this is the eyes. Since it is easy to understand how 
people can be concerned about the outward appearance of the body after death, one 
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power first to save a life. Only after this possibility has been absolutely exhausted do they begin 
to consider organ donation.
30 Newton, p. 6.
proviso of an organ conscription policy could state that a personʼs eyes will not be 
harvested without prior consent. In making such an exception, we would also 
simultaneously affirm that all viable internal organs can and should appropriately be 
taken for transplantation. Advances in surgical methods make the recovery of many 
organs less invasive, involving fewer scars and a significantly less amount of open, 
garish incisions. The outward appearance of the body, of fundamental importance for 
burial and visitation rituals, would be preserved under a policy of cadaveric organ 
conscription.
Theme 4: Transplant recipients 
! If nearly every person deemed eligible by UNOS to receive an organ transplant 
actually gets one, as could very well be the case with organ conscription, questions 
could be raised concerning the recipients of those transplants. People might argue that 
certain recipients are not fit to be granted the gift of life that came from the organs of a 
deceased individual whom they have never met. As it is, this argument can be made with 
regard to the current system of organ allocation. Concerns about transplant recipients 
range from questions about the role of race and money in allocation to misgivings about 
a personʼs moral worth, and just deserts.31 Even though these concerns will never 
entirely disappear, I believe that organ conscription is best-suited to deal with them.
! Cadaveric organ conscription alleviates many concerns about transplant 
recipients and the allocation process in general by making both procurement and 
allocation more equal. Poor and rich alike are candidates for organ harvest after death. 
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Role of Status: Did Mickey Mantle Get Special Treatment?” Chapter 23 in Transplantation Ethics, 
pp.352-362.
A cadaver is a cadaver, and nobody should be able to purchase an exemption from 
conscription because they managed to acquire material wealth in life. We should take 
care to prevent a situation similar to the historical institution of the military draft, which 
unjustly allowed those with means to either pay a large fee instead of going to war, or 
pay a surrogate to enlist in their stead. Though such inequality, appalling as it is, affected 
such a critical interest as national security, it is not likely to affect conscription of organs 
from cadavers. Monetary payment scarcely serves as a replacement for a functional vital 
organ. Furthermore, everyone (except those exempt for religious reasons) would be 
conscripted after death, and so finding a “surrogate” to donate an organ in oneʼs place 
would be futile. 
! Current allocation criteria do not assign any kind of preference for specific races 
or ethnicities. Organs would not be harvested selectively with regard to race. However, 
were organ conscription to be established, minorities on the UNOS list would likely 
receive organs faster, resulting in less incidence of rejection since more organs will be 
procured from cadavers that shared their ethnicity. UNOS currently does not make 
matching up the ethnicity of recipients and donors a priority in allocation, but it is 
understood that a recipientʼs body will react more positively to, and will be less likely to 
reject, tissue from someone with a similar ethnicity.32 Need, and time on the waiting list, 
will always overrule the ethnicity of the donor. Conscription would increase the supply of 
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chance of receiving one if there are large numbers of donors from their racial/ethnic background. 
This is because compatible blood types and tissue markers—critical qualities for donor/recipient 
matching—are more likely to be found among members of the same ethnicity. A greater diversity 
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Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Service Administration 
(HRSA) fact sheet: “Why Minority Donors Are Needed.” Accessible online at: http://
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organs coming from different minorities, and could therefore more closely match up 
recipients with donors according to ethnicity. 
! Questions about a potential organ recipientʼs moral worth may be asked by those 
skeptical of organ donation, but they cannot form a major part of any method of 
allocation or procurement. Beyond restricting people who abuse drugs or alcohol from 
continuing to do so after receiving their first transplant (a part of existing policy), it is not 
clear how anyone could objectively measure another personʼs social worth or moral 
goodness. Horror stories of “selection committees” choosing whether certain people 
receive life-saving, critical treatment based on speculation and individual moral precepts 
have been publicly discussed for years. A prominent example of this was recorded in 
1962 by a journalist named Shana Alexander. As a rare and novel technology at the time 
“artificial kidney machines,” or dialysis machines, became a hot commodity and a scarce 
resource for sustaining life. Swedish Hospital in Seattle, Washington acquired one, and 
quickly assembled a selection committee to decide which patients on a waiting list would 
receive treatment. Transcripts of the committeeʼs meetings and discussions show 
rampant biased decision-making, pure uninformed speculation about personal character, 
and a preference to help those who were younger, employed, educated and who 
happened to live in the region.33 
! What examples like the Seattle selection committee (sometimes also referred to 
as the “God Committee”) reveal is that there is no fair way to judge the social or moral 
worth of anybodyʼs life. Given this premise, and the idea that everyone deserves equal 
opportunity and access to health care, it follows that the most fair method of procuring 
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organs is conscription. Likewise, the consequences of organ conscription will obviate the 
need to ration certain medical treatments, resources and supplies. Allocation, as a result, 
can proceed according only to relevant medical criteria and will never be based on such 
arbitrary things as race and wealth, nor on the vague concept of moral worth. 
Systemic benefits and practical considerations
! Thus far, I have discussed the formal arguments for and against organ 
conscription, and some main reasons why many people are uncomfortable with organ 
donation. I have argued that a policy of organ conscription is the more ethical option in 
the face of growing need for organ transplants and an unfortunate lack of willing donors. 
However, there are further considerations and arguments that need to be made which 
help to establish cadaveric organ conscription as a realistic and beneficial policy 
governing organ procurement. Our current procurement policy purports to respect 
autonomy to the greatest extent possible, but does so at the expense of all other 
considerations, both moral and practical. In this section, I will discuss some of the 
practical ways in which organ conscription is a preferable alternative to a policy of 
consent at all costs. 
! A major challenge in health care is creating a system which distributes resources 
justly, and in some respects ensures equal care to all, but which is also as efficient is 
possible. A life spent hooked to a dialysis machine, having oneʼs blood circulated out of 
the body, purified and detoxed, and then returned is surely quite miserable. It is also not 
sustainable, when every patient with chronic kidney failure who desperately needs a 
transplant to continue living must have dialysis performed at least once per week, and 
sometimes three times per week. Harvesting organs from cadavers automatically would 
liberate thousands of people from having to endure dialysis, sometimes for as long as 
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one or more years. The efficiency of health care delivery in general would be increased 
in at least two ways: 1) more organs would lead to better, more targeted and specific 
allocation (as discussed in the previous section), which would also result in decreased 
transplant rejection and increased retention, both extending the long-term survival rates. 
Physicians could afford to be more selective when deciding which organs would work 
best for each specific patient; 2) the amount of time a person will need to spend 
receiving dialysis, in the event of kidney failure, would be significantly reduced. Less 
resources would be expended keeping the chronically ill nominally functional.
! An unfortunate and unfair side effect of the current absolute consent-based 
model of procurement is that families are often forced to decide on behalf of a recently 
deceased loved one whether organ recovery should proceed. This happens mainly when 
donor cards cannot be found, or a personʼs donation status is unknown or unknowable. 
In the event that a patientʼs consent is known, physicians tend to defer to the wishes of 
the family anyway.34 Their grief may overwhelm them, or they may be insisting 
vehemently that doctors follow their wishes, perhaps out of misunderstanding of the 
donation process. Under the duress of experiencing someone close pass away, most 
people would have difficulty making a rational, informed or altruistic decision about organ 
donation. Organ conscription would keep families from having to make the sometimes 
divisive decision to donate a loved oneʼs organs, sparing them the distress of thinking 
about ordering their bodies carved up for organs. I honestly believe this is the most 
humane thing to do, that families shouldnʼt have to make such a decision, and as a 
result more closure would be afforded to the family of the deceased. 
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The New England Journal of Medicine (2003) 349: 667-674. Of the three factors affecting the 
conversion rate--the rate at which potential donors become actual donors--in the donation 
process, two related to familial consent: “the rate of requests made to families” and “the rate of 
consent by families,” p. 672. The average consent rate was found to be only 54%, with the 
request rate 30% higher, at 84%. 
! Another problem with the radical consent-based model is the necessity of 
keeping people who have been declared brain dead physically functioning until consent 
is obtained. In fact, a similar worry identified in Newtonʼs review was that physicians 
would keep people functioning who had already died in order to get their organs: 
“Juxtaposed with the notion that organs are removed prematurely was the belief that 
doctors prolong life unnecessarily to obtain organs.”35 Under conscription, brain dead 
individuals would no longer be sustained on life support for prolonged periods of time, 
kept artificially and physically alive while donation status or consent from family is 
sought. 
! Faster harvesting of viable organs helps allay concerns about the motives of 
doctors. It also contributes to creating a more efficient system. Less time keeping 
cadavers on life support means less money spent pumping dead peopleʼs hearts and 
ventilating air through their lungs; this, in turn, means more money and resources 
available to treat the living. Likewise, the more kidneys that can be transplanted into 
patients sustained by routine dialysis treatment yields spending a significantly less 
amount of money. According to the National Kidney Foundation, the federal government 
pays around 80 percent of dialysis costs for most patients receiving it.36 Private 
insurance costs for dialysis would also decrease, resulting in lowered premiums for 
many others as well. The high costs associated with health care could be significantly 
mitigated if, even only as a first step, we initiate conscripting organs from cadavers. 
! I have, throughout this paper, been discussing a policy of cadaveric organ 
conscription. This moniker may be a bit misleading, though. The type of lifesaving 
material that can be harvested from a human body is not limited to vital organs. Also, 
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36 National Kidney Foundation publications; NKF website: http://www.kidney.org/atoz/content/
Myths.cfm. 
even just parts of some organs suffice to help someone in need--a liver lobe and section 
of the cornea serving as examples. Apart from bodily organs, such things as bone 
marrow, skin, cartilage and even arteries and veins are possible to transplant, or graft, 
from one body to another. 
! A perfect illustration of the amount of good that conscription of organs (and other 
tissues) can produce is the example of bone marrow transplant. Bone marrow is a 
notoriously difficult tissue to transplant, due to the many specifications needed to match 
up between donor and recipient. The procedure to determine marrow tissue type is also 
extremely invasive, requiring a biopsy of tissue to be extracted directly from the bones in 
the hip. There are only very limited numbers of people currently on the bone marrow 
registry and, consequently, a small amount of diversity in tissue type exists for 
immediate matching. The chances of matching a donor with a recipient for a bone 
marrow transplant are therefore very low, with many potential recipientsʼ best chances 
coming from familial donations. The upshot here is, were cadavers to have organs and 
other material harvested as soon as possible following death, bone marrow could be 
quickly typed, analyzed and extracted for transplantation as well. Thus, cadaveric organ 
conscription could benefit not only individuals with ESOD, but also those who have 
developed malignant forms of cancer, such as leukemia. 
! I trust that no one would raise any special objections to bone marrow extraction 
from cadavers in order to aid those fighting off cancer. If all efforts to move closer to a 
conscription model rather than a consent-based model of organ recovery fail, perhaps at 
least more people could embrace the somewhat modest proposal of mandatory bone 
marrow harvest. The scope of diseases, disorders and other medical conditions that 
cadaveric organ conscription would help alleviate is indeed staggering.
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Conclusion
! Ethical agreement is important. Although no policy or moral outlook will ever 
attain unanimous support in an open and diverse society, it is absolutely essential that 
such a policy as organ conscription be openly discussed and debated in the public 
sphere. In attempting to direct our policies toward social justice and fairness, we should 
decide which procedures are the most rational. Social justice can be maximized through 
instituting rational and fair procedures. I surmise that many of the worries people might 
have about organ conscription, along with a concern for autonomy, stem from 
considerations of fairness. These two values--autonomy and fairness--deserve 
protection in our law and our moral deliberations. 
! Organ conscription challenges us to consider more deeply which of our liberties 
can be taken away, or restricted, in order to secure other goods. It challenges us to think 
whether certain choices are important enough to take precedence over helping others 
with which we share a society. Specifically, we may be led to ask whether the current 
consent-based system of organ procurement is fair, and whether it really takes the 
consent of the donor seriously. Consider that the force of DNR (Do-Not-Resuscitate) 
orders, or Advanced Directives, can often (but not always) be overridden by family 
members with power of attorney. Similarly, the family of a deceased patient can 
contradict the choice of the deceased to donate organs, and can prevent physicians 
from harvesting viable organs. (This practice is being modified through proposed law, 
however.) Family members of the deceased act out of good intentions and loving 
motives, but they also are susceptible to overpowering emotion, and states of distress. 
They may not be the best-suited people to make choices about organ donation. 
! If we donʼt take consent seriously now, then the argument for organ conscription 
becomes much stronger, since it avoids the requirement for consent altogether. Some 
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think that consent is an absolute requirement when we are discussing medical 
interventions and the body. I tend to agree with them; consent is undoubtedly an 
important prerequisite for determining how our bodies are treated. Again, though, even in 
many medical procedures that we think should be decided by the patient, consent is 
often overridden. End-of-life issues speak to this tension. Only two states in the U.S. 
have enacted laws that empower terminally-ill people to be able to choose how and 
when to end their lives during times of extreme suffering. Many of the same advocates 
for consent in medical ethics, and organ donation in particular, believe that this option 
should not be available to individuals. 
! The arguments here are designed not only to provoke further thought and 
discussion, but also to point the way toward a different approach to organ donation. We 
should begin to think of organ donation as something required of us by our deepest 
moral convictions, and not simply as a supererogatory act, or a gift of sublime charity. 
While giving an organ is indeed a morally praiseworthy act, it should not be held up as 
solely the example of saints, or those possessing greater moral sensibilities. It is, in fact, 
a duty and we should begin to view it as such. Once we begin to understand why 
donation is a duty, and how we can implement a policy of conscription without 
committing egregious violations of freedom, we can move closer to a world where no 
one suffers indefinitely for lack of a simple organ transplant.
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